## Meaning of “Engagement”

### Evolution of “Engagement”

#### 1. Since Nixon

Hart 15 — Melanie Hart, Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015 (“Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China,” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, September 29th, Available Online at <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf>, Accessed 06-22-2016, p. 1-2)

Hearing on the Changing Landscape of U.S.-China Relations

The United States has pursued an engagement strategy toward China for almost four decades. Regardless of party affiliation, every U.S. president since Nixon has aimed to integrate China into the international system. That decision has been and continues to be one of the greatest American foreign policy successes of the post-World War II era. The U.S. engagement strategy toward China and alliance relationships in the Asia-Pacific region made it possible for Asia-Pacific nations to focus on economic development at home instead of strategic competition abroad.

Now, nearly 37 years after U.S.-China normalization, China is an upper-middle-income nation. China’s economic growth is allowing it to expand its military capabilities and foreign policy ambitions. That is a natural expansion. Beijing is increasingly unwilling to sit on the sidelines and watch other nations shape international norms. Today, instead of [end page 1] biding their time, Chinese leaders are experimenting with new ways to use their nation’s growing strengths to shape the international environment in China’s favor. On some issues, those efforts dovetail with U.S. interests, so China’s new assertiveness is opening up new opportunities for cooperation. Where U.S.-China interests are not aligned, however, Chinese actions are reheating old frictions and creating new ones. Those frictions—most notably in the South China Sea—are triggering new debates in the United States about overall foreign policy strategy toward China. Some U.S. observers discount the new opportunities for cooperation and argue that because some challenges in the U.S.-China relationship appear difficult to navigate, the United States should scrap the entire engagement strategy and begin treating China as a strategic rival. Those arguments are misguided.

The fundamentals of the U.S.-China relationship are the same today as they were in the 1970s when the United States first reached out to turn this former rival into a strategic partner. Chinese leaders still prioritize domestic economic growth and stability above all other policy goals; they still view the U.S.-China bilateral as China’s most important foreign policy relationship and want that relationship to be peaceful and cooperative. The Chinese military still focuses first and foremost on defending the Chinese Communist Party’s right to govern the Chinese mainland and its territories. These fundamentals have not changed. What has changed in recent years is China’s capabilities and the tools Beijing is using to further its domestic and foreign policy interests. Those changes call for some tactical adjustments on the U.S. side. Those changes do not warrant an abandonment of the engagement strategy that has brought, and can continue to bring, decades of enduring peace and economic growth for all Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States.

My testimony will cover four main points:

1. Economic and political challenges within China are still Beijing’s top priority, and those challenges trigger a new assertiveness from Beijing.

2. China’s new assertiveness is constructive in some areas of U.S.-China relations and problematic in others.

3. The current U.S. engagement strategy excels at expanding cooperation in constructive areas and is achieving incremental progress in problematic areas.

4. The United States should maintain this engagement strategy but expand its tactical toolkit for addressing problematic Chinese behavior.

#### 2. Bush

Mann 10 — James Mann, European and Eurasian Studies Program Scholar-in-Residence at the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, former Senior Writer-in-Residence at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, author of a series of award-winning books about American foreign policy and China, 2010 (“Behold China,” *New Republic*, March 17th, Available Online at <https://newrepublic.com/article/73808/behold-china>, Accessed 06-22-2016)

After the upheavals of 1989—the Tiananmen demonstrations and the bloody crackdown, the fall of the Berlin Wall later that year—American leaders struggled to come up with a new basis for dealing with China. The initial formulation came from President George H.W. Bush. Seeking to explain America’s continuing ties with a regime that had so recently opened fire on its own citizenry, Bush settled on the idea of “engagement.” It was a curious choice of words. The phrase “constructive engagement” had been used by the Reagan administration a few years earlier as justification for its friendly policy toward South Africa in the face of a congressional effort to impose economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, as applied to China, the word “engagement” took hold—to such a remarkable extent, in fact, that it has been used, over the past two decades, to describe contacts not just with Beijing but with other repressive regimes around the world, from Burma to Sudan to Iran.

Still, as even many of its proponents acknowledged, “engagement” was itself merely a tactic, an agreement to go to meetings, and not a strategy. It was left to the Clinton administration to come up with that. The United States hoped to open up the Chinese political system. The means for accomplishing that change would be trade and investment. Economic prosperity, the strategy predicted, would lead eventually to political liberalization. In this analysis, China would follow the same political path as its Asian neighbors, South Korea and Taiwan, both of which had moved from authoritarianism to democracy during the 1980s.

#### 3. Clinton

Feaver 6 — Peter D. Feaver, Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University, served as Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, 2006 (“The Clinton Administration’s China Engagement Policy in Perspective,” Paper Presented at the Conference on War and Peace at Duke University, Available Online at <https://web.duke.edu/pass/pdf/warpeaceconf/p-feaver.pdf>, Accessed 06-22-2016, p. 8-9)

4. The Debate Over Constructive Engagement Misstates the Alternatives

The Clinton Administration frames the debate as a choice between constructive engagement and containment. This is sloppy analysis but shrewd rhetoric. Sloppy analysis because, in fact, containment is not the opposite of engagement. The opposite of engagement is isolationism. Isolationism can either be generalized, as was the case for the first hundred years of the American Republic (at least vis-a-vis Europe) or specific, as was the case with US-Albanian relations during the Cold War. Framing the issue this way, however, is shrewd rhetoric because virtually no one supports isolationism. The Clinton Administration says that if you do not want isolationism, you must therefore support our policy.

This of course, misstates the area of real debate. There is a widespread consensus that the United States needs to engage China. The true debate is over how to engage.

Under the rubric of constructive engagement, there are four basic options depending on the degree to which the interests of the players overlap: (1) direct confrontation/rollback, where one country seeks to diminish the position of the other (viz. U.S. policy on Iraq); (2) containment, where one country seeks to limit the advances of another country’s position (viz. U.S. Cold War [end page 8] policy on the Soviet Union); (3) appeasement, where one country seeks to manage the apparently inevitable advance of the other with concessions on minor points so as to avoid concessions on major issues (viz. British policy on the United States at the turn of the century); or (4) enlargement, where [one] country views the other’s interests as so harmonious that virtually any advance for one is an advance the other (viz. U.S. policy on Great Britain ever since World War I).

Given this more accurate range of choices, it is evident that the Administration has adopted a general posture of constructive engagement (not isolationism) and under that general rubric is pursuing a specific policy of appeasement. Several years ago, I asked the architect of the Administration’s Asia security policy what was the difference between our policy and a policy of appeasement. His response: “Appeasement has a long and distinguished history in diplomatic affairs.”

#### 4. Obama

Hart 15 — Melanie Hart, Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2015 (“Assessing American Foreign Policy Toward China,” Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, September 29th, Available Online at <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/29082451/HartSFRC-testimony-09.29.pdf>, Accessed 06-22-2016, p. 6-8)

Multitrack engagement strategy

Under the Obama administration, the United States is conducting the U.S-China relationship along multiple parallel tracks. The administration formulates China policy on an issue-by-issue basis. Where interests converge, the administration seeks to expand concrete cooperation. Where interests diverge and China pursues actions that impose direct or indirect costs on the United States, the administration seeks to counter and deter those actions. This multitrack approach enables the United States to push back against problematic actions as needed without curtailing overall U.S.-China cooperation. This is a realpolitik, eyes-wide-open approach to engagement. Engagement need not be predicated on the assumption that China will not seek to undermine U.S. interests in some areas. The United States can work constructively with China while accepting that we have different principles, that we are not perfectly aligned. We can work along multiple tracks at the same time: expanding cooperation in one area while confronting differences and exchanging threats in another. That dynamic was on display through the most recent U.S.-China presidential summit, which aimed to achieve three distinct goals.

First, where interests converge, aim to work constructively on concrete initiatives that provide tangible benefits for both nations and lay groundwork for even bigger and more beneficial cooperation in the future. Successes from the recent summit include:

• Securing a $3.1 billion climate finance commitment from China that exceeds what the United States has pledged thus far via the Green Climate Fund, or GCF.16 In addition, prior to the official presidential meeting, U.S. and Chinese climate negotiators convened a climate leadership summit during which 11 Chinese city- and provincial-level governments formed an Alliance of Peaking Pioneer Cities, or APPC, under which all are committing to peak carbon emissions earlier than the nationwide 2030 target announced last November.17 Since China issued its commitment to peak in 2030 and to make its “best efforts” to peak earlier, new economic data have opened the possibility that China could peak well before the current deadline and possibility as early as 2025. All of the APPC cities believe that with the right policy mix, they can beat the [end page 6] 2030 target and serve as models for the rest of the nation. Early-peak targets vary by location based on individual capabilities. Beijing, Guangzhou, and Zhenjiang have committed to peak around 2020, 10 years ahead of China’s official national target.

• Working collaboratively with China to expand the international reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s peace and stability are critical to both U.S. and Chinese national security objectives. The United States and China co-chaired a high-level U.N. General Assembly meeting on Afghan reconstruction during which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on other nations to join the United States and China in supporting Afghan peace, development, and integration into the global community.18 The United States and China are already partnering on capacity-building programs in Afghanistan, and China has committed to provide $150 million in development assistance. Such collaborative efforts are bringing China forward on the diplomatic and development stage at a time when U.S. funding is diverted to other pressing crises. Furthermore, such collaboration should become the foundation for greater Chinese development assistance to Afghanistan’s long-term development.

Second, where interests diverge, take actions that decrease the risk of inadvertent conflict with China and increase the costs China pays for problematic behavior. Successes from the recent summit include:

• Establishing new annexes on air-to-air safety and crisis communication under the military-to-military confidence-building measure, or CBM, framework launched in November 2014.19 The 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 and a Chinese J-8 aircraft and recent incidents between U.S. and Chinese aircraft underscore the need to establish better operational standards and best practices for military aircraft and military vessels operating in close proximity in the Asia-Pacific region.

• Launching a new high-level dialogue on cybercrime and securing what appears to be a new presidential-level commitment on commercial cyberespionage. The new high-level dialogue will hold its first meeting before the end of 2015 and, if the mechanism works as intended, will give U.S. officials new tools for investigating and prosecuting cyberattacks and intrusions attributed to Chinese actors. In addition, according to the U.S. fact sheet on the recent summit meetings, the two presidents agreed that neither the United States nor China “will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”20 This agreement is not likely to completely eliminate those activities on the Chinese side, but if the White House did secure a personal commitment from President Xi on this issue, that will increase the reputational damage Chinese leaders will face if their nation continues to engage in commercial cybertheft and those activities are reported by the United States. Within China, a presidential-level commitment of this nature would likely add new administrative restrictions on these activities. [end page 7] Chinese leaders will have an incentive to improve their awareness of and control over what is happening at the operational level. They may apply new restrictions and require higher-level approvals for cyberspace intrusions targeting U.S. commercial entities. If so, those controls may reduce the scope of this activity and therefore reduce the associated harm to U.S. commercial interests.

Third, when Chinese behavior poses a direct and serious threat to American interests, take actions, as necessary, to signal that the United States will not withhold punitive action in one issue area to pursue promising opportunities in another. When pursuing U.S.-China relations among multiple tracks, there is a risk that China will assume that if there are good cooperative opportunities on the table, the United States will not risk losing those opportunities by taking punitive action on more-controversial issues. Clear U.S.-China communication is necessary to avoid this dangerous misperception, which could lead Beijing to underestimate the probability the United States will take punitive actions in response to provocative behavior. In the run-up to the most recent summit, the Obama administration utilized public and private channels to signal that the United States was seriously considering levying cybersanctions against China and that the White House was willing to issue those sanctions right before the September presidential summit regardless of the impact that would have on President Xi’s state visit. Beijing took those threats seriously and dispatched a high-level delegation to Washington to discuss cyber issues two weeks before the official presidential visit.21 This presummit communication likely played a role in the new U.S.-China cybercrime mechanism and new commercial espionage commitment mentioned above.

#### 5. Is Everything Engagement Now?

Traub 10 — James Traub, Contributing Editor at *Foreign Policy*, Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2010 (“Terms of Engagement,” *Foreign Policy*, February 19th, Available Online at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/19/terms-of-engagement/>, Accessed 06-22-2016)

Virtually all conversations with Obama administration foreign-policy officials, no matter where they begin, come to rest at "engagement" — that vexing, mutable, all-purpose word. The U.S. president has "engaged" with rogue states, civil society, the United Nations, and citizens around the globe. Iran vindicates the policy of engagement — or discredits it. China is a failure of engagement, Russia a success. Inside the Obama realm, engagement has come to mean "good diplomacy."

To critics on both the left and right, however, it has come to mean "bad diplomacy" — cynical or naive, depending on which side you come from.

These days — these shaky days — the critics seem to be gaining the upper hand, making those Obama officials increasingly defensive about their policy toward autocratic states, whether in the Middle East or Eurasia, Iran or Sudan. Having spent years thinking hard thoughts in universities and think tanks, magazines and books, they cannot believe that they are losing the definitional war over their own policy. They are eager, and maybe a little desperate, to set things aright. And so it was, earlier this week, that when I asked to talk to one official about democracy promotion, I wound up having a 75-minute phone conversation with four White House figures, much of it about "engagement."

"A lot of the baggage we carry," said an officeholder I might as well designate as Senior Official #1 — the conversation was on background and the White House that offered up these folks to defend the policy was insistent they not do so on the record — "is the word ‘engagement.’ People hear the word and they think ‘constructive engagement.’" I’m not sure this is true outside certain New England common rooms, but it’s definitely not an association the Obama White House would like to encourage. After all, Ronald Reagan’s administration used that expression to justify the United States’s ongoing relationship with South Africa’s apartheid government, a policy widely derided as a cynical pretext to preserve ties with a Cold War ally. And it failed.

If "constructive engagement" is one definition the Obamans are eager to avoid, another is straightforward, old-fashioned Kissingerian "realism" — if by realism one means dealing with the interests of states, including brutal states, to the exclusion of those of ordinary citizens. As another interlocutor — call him Senior Official #2 — growing rather hot under the telephonic collar, put it, "A lot of my friends said, ‘You guys are a bunch of engagement realists. They’ll never talk about democracy and human rights.’" Barack Obama himself arguably encouraged this view during his 2008 presidential campaign by criticizing George W. Bush’s moralistic bluster, by regularly expressing his high regard for archrealists like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, and by stipulating his willingness to meet "without preconditions" with even the worst tyrants. And since becoming president he has muted criticism of the regimes in Sudan and Burma, and referred respectfully to "the Islamic Republic of Iran."

The allegation of realpolitik is still intolerable — even baffling — to these officials, who pledged themselves to Obama out of a deep faith in his redemptive promise. But if engagement rests upon the expectation that treating autocrats and theocrats with respect will significantly alter their behavior, then it suffers less from cynicism than from credulity — which is the other article of baggage under which engagement now staggers. How can anyone believe that? Administration officials have been at pains to deny that they ever did, especially since Iran has trampled Obama’s entreaties underfoot. The goal of engaging Iran, they now say, was not to change Iran’s behavior but to change the behavior of more tractable states, like Russia and China, by showing that the United States was willing to go the last mile even with the Axis of Evil.

Of course, there is abundant evidence that Obama and some of his chief advisors really did hope that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would moderate nuclear policy if they showed due regard for his country’s national interests, as Helene Cooper recently noted in the New York Times. But it’s also true that from the outset, officials have made the secondary argument for the virtues of engagement. The SOs insisted to me, as other SOs have in the past, that Obama’s Iran policy in fact constitutes a triumph of engagement because Russia has increasingly come around to the American view on the imperative for sanctions. They argue that the Russian change of heart owes not only to the country’s growing alarm over Iranian ambitions, but also to the White House’s persistent effort to put relations with Russia on a less adversarial footing than they were at the end of the Bush years. We have engaged with Russia and reaped the benefits. Of course, Russia hasn’t yet signed on to a tough sanctions measure against Iran; and China, which so far has pocketed Obama’s shows of deference without much display of gratitude, may scotch the whole affair.

Let us stipulate, then, that engagement is not quite so naive as it appears. But is it not, still, a realist bargain, trading away those universal values that the president so often evokes in the hopes of geostrategic wins, whether on Iran or climate change or the global economy?

"We’re trying to say ‘no,’" says SO #2. "We’re not going to accept that tradeoff. We’re going to do this in parallel."

Trying, of course, isn’t doing. But in Russia, this official argues, Obama successfully lowered the temperature with President Dmitry Medvedev while still meeting with dissidents and civil society groups, and he criticized the country’s undemocratic elections last fall. And it was "parallel," not a "tradeoff": Obama didn’t offer to go easy on human rights, or for that matter missile defense, to get an arms deal, nor did he insist that progress on arms control would depend on democratization.

There is a term for such a nuanced policy: "double-track engagement," an expression used by George Shultz, secretary of state during Reagan’s second term, who pursued national interests while at the same time helping to pry open such autocratic Cold War allies as Chile and the Philippines. And since Obama, unlike Reagan, puts real store by the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, he is in fact practicing a yet more nuanced "triple-track engagement" — with states, with peoples, and with international bodies. The United States has rejoined the Human Rights Council, paid up its U.N. dues, and promoted the G-20 over the G-8.

It became clear enough, after 75 minutes, that engagement is not one thing, or two things. It’s three or four things. It’s "multifaceted and complex." It’s complicated because the world is complicated. Maybe that’s why the Obama administration clings to its favorite word — because complicated is hard to explain. Simple policies, like Bush’s Freedom Agenda, afford immediate gratification — and then deep disappointment down the road. Nuanced, many-things-at-once policies require patience and a tolerance for ambiguous victories. We now have abundant evidence that this is not a patient or tolerant moment. You have to wonder how long complicated can survive in the absence of big wins.

All of which leaves our senior officials increasingly defensive. "Does it take time to get a bureaucracy oriented around the idea of multitrack diplomacy?" asked SO #1. "All the habits of interaction are binary. So it does."

Sometimes, as in China or Egypt, engagement with the state seems to preclude engagement with the aspirations of citizens and you get, well, realism. Other times, folks like us just don’t get it. Of course, we might feel less confused if the Obamans used some term other than "engagement" to cover virtually everything they do.

### Can Be QPQ or Not-QPQ

#### Economic engagement includes both conditional and unconditional policies.

Kahler and Kastner 6 — Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan,” Draft of a Manuscript Later Published in the *Journal of Peace Research*, Available Online at <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc>, Accessed 05-06-2013)

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.

Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state.

#### Economic engagement can be conditional *or* unconditional.

Kahler and Kastner 6 — Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations at the school of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California-San Diego, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Maryland, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California-San Diego, 2006 (“Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Volume 43, Number 5, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online, p. 524-525)

Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations – is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time, however, relatively little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists (Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland, 1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more widespread than previously recognized.

We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases, we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international politics.

Economic Engagement: Strategies and Expectations

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic ‘carrots’, are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional [end page 524] strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.

The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state’s influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target state’s behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (H1), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2

Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

### Must Be QPQ

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2 [HSS Packet]

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct) [HSS Packet]

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

**Diplomatic and economic engagement is the offer of positive inducements in exchange for specific concessions**

**Hall, 14** - Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University (Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4) [Michigan Packet]

This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It follows the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy, positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, or a weapons system provided in return for a specific concession. With the second type of strategy, inducements are offered merely to catalyze something bigger, perhaps even involving the wholesale transformation of a target society.10 In this kind of engagement, many different incentives might be laid out for many different constituencies, from educational opportunities for emerging leaders to new terms of trade for the economic elite.

The objects of engagement can include changing specific policies of the target state or transforming the wider political, economic, or social order of a target society. Both of these objectives could be pursued with coercive strategies employing either compellence or deterrence—or indeed with a mixture of both engagement and coercion." But much recent research has argued that the evidence for the efficacy of both compellence and deterrence in changing target state policies is inconclusive.12 Both military and economic sanctions have been shown to have mixed results, and many scholars argue that coercion rarely works." By contrast, there is some considerable evidence that engagement strategies can both elicit discrete quid pro quos from states and generate wider political and social change within them that might in the medium to long term lead to changed behavior at home or in international relations.14 Moreover, it is clear that engagement is both more commonly utilized than often recognized by scholars of international relations and that it is generally considered more politically accepted to politicians and publics in both engaging states and in the states they seek to engage.15

Engagement strategies take different forms depending on their objectives. They can emphasize diplomacy, aiming at the improvement of formal, state-to- state contacts, and be led by professional diplomats, special envoys, or politicians. Alternatively, they can emphasize military ties, utilizing military-to- military dialogues, exchanges, and training to build trust, convey strategic intentions, or simply foster greater openness in the target state’s defense establishment.16 They can be primarily economic in approach, using trade, investment, and technology transfer to engender change in the target society and perhaps to generate greater economic interdependence, constraining a target state's foreign policy choices.17 Finally, they can seek to create channels for people-to-people contact through state-driven public diplomacy, business forums and research networks, aid and development assistance, and so on.

### Can’t Be QPQ

#### Engagement must be unconditional—it’s *distinct* from conditional policies. QPQ plans are not topical.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)

First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive political consequences.19

‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20 To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy.

#### This turns education and beats reasonability: there are s*erious policy differences* between engagement and conditionality — choosing the right tool is essential for foreign policy success.

Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” *Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement*, May, Available Online at http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23-24)

There are well-known advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. Engagement can help to establish the conditions [end page 23] under which democratic principles and human rights, for example, can be protected. It can foster the long-term processes (learning; development of a middle class; strengthening of the freedom of the press) that allow local actors to effect political and economic change. Engagement challenges sovereignty less than conditionality does, and so will be more acceptable to governments. It could be more effective to persuade governments to comply with liberal norms than to coerce them to do so – as coercion may simply induce stubborn resistance.

But put ‘constructive’ in front of the term, and some of its negative connotations become clearer: constructive engagement with apartheid South Africa was criticised for allowing Western/Northern governments (in particular the US and UK) to continue with business as usual, putting at risk no important commercial exchanges, yet to claim to domestic audiences that quiet diplomacy was more effective. Engagement, in other words, can allow trade and investment to proceed unhindered even with quite despicable regimes.

But there is another, more practical problem with engagement: such a strategy will work only if domestic actors want to trade, invest, ‘engage’ with the target state. Where practices are so illiberal as to make the economic environment unattractive, or where conditions are impossible (in war-torn states, for example), or where the general state of development or level of natural resources is low, engagement does not seem likely to work well.

A strategy of conditionality has the potential to be quite effective if the target state wants the benefits on offer or fears losing them. Some observers have argued that conditionality is of most use in encouraging countries to improve their human rights records or implement specific economic reforms, but is not well suited for grander objectives such as encouraging democracy (which depends overwhelmingly on local conditions and cannot be imposed by outsiders). But there are serious drawbacks to using conditionality, and negative conditionality in particular.

### Precision Important

#### Definitional precision is a precondition for educational, policy-relevant debates about “engagement”.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### Carefully defining “engagement” is necessary for effective debate.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

While the term "engagement" enjoys great consistency and clarity of meaning in the discourse of romantic love, it enjoys neither in the discourse of statecraft. Currently, practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy are vigorously debating the merits of engagement as a strategy for modifying the behavior of unsavory regimes. The quality of this debate, however, is diminished by the persistent inability of the US foreign policy establishment to advance a coherent and analytically rigorous conceptualization of engagement. In this essay, I begin with a brief survey of the conceptual fog that surrounds engagement and then attempt to give a more refined definition. I will use this definition as the basis for drawing a sharp distinction between engagement and alternative policy approaches, especially appeasement, isolation and containment.

In the contemporary lexicon of United States foreign policy, few terms have been as frequently or as confusingly invoked as that of engagement.1 A growing consensus extols the virtues of engagement as the most promising policy for managing the threats posed to the US by foreign adversaries. In recent years, engagement constituted the Clinton administration's declared approach in the conduct of bilateral relations with such countries as China, Russia, North Korea and Vietnam.

Robert Suettinger, a onetime member of the Clinton administration's National Security Council, remarked that the word engagement has "been overused and poorly defined by a variety of policymakers and speechwriters" and has "become shopworn to the point that there is little agreement on what it actually means."2 The Clinton foreign policy team attributed five distinct meanings to engagement:3

1) A broad-based grand strategic orientation: In this sense, engagement is considered synonymous with American internationalism and global leadership. For example, in a 1993 speech, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake observed that American public opinion was divided into two rival camps: "On the one side is protectionism and limited foreign engagement; on the other is active American engagement abroad on behalf of democracy and expanded trade."4

2) A specific approach to managing bilateral relations with a target state through the unconditional provision of continuous concessions to that state: During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton criticized the Bush administration's "ill-advised and failed" policy of "constructive engagement" toward China as one that "coddled the dictators and pleaded for progress, but refused to impose penalties for intransigence."5

3) A bilateral policy characterized by the conditional provision of concessions to a target state: The Clinton administration announced in May 1993 that the future extension of Most Favored Nation trading status to China would be conditional on improvements in the Chinese government's domestic human rights record.6 Likewise, in the Agreed Framework signed by the US and North Korea in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with heavy oil, new light-water nuclear reactors and eventual diplomatic and economic normalization in exchange for a freeze in the North's nuclear weapons program.7

4) A bilateral policy characterized by the broadening of contacts in areas of mutual interest with a target state: Key to this notion of engagement is the idea that areas of dialogue and fruitful cooperation should be broadened and not be held hostage through linkage to areas of continuing disagreement and friction. The Clinton administration inaugurated such a policy toward China in May 1994 by declaring that it would not tie the annual MFN decision to the Chinese government's human rights record.8 Similarly, the administration's foreign policy toward the Russian Federation has largely been one of engagement and described as an effort to "build areas of agreement and ... develop policies to manage our differences."9

5) A bilateral policy characterized by the provision of technical assistance to facilitate economic and political liberalization in a target state: In its 1999 national security report, the White House proclaimed that its "strategy of engagement with each of the NIS [Newly Independent States]" consisted of "working with grassroots organizations, independent media, and emerging entrepreneurs" to "improve electoral processes and help strengthen civil society," and to help the governments of the NIS to "build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a market democracy, to fight crime and corruption [and] to advance human rights and the rule of law."10

Unfortunately, scholars have not fared better than policymakers in the effort to conceptualize engagement because they often make at least one of the following critical errors: (1) treating engagement as a synonym for appeasement; (2) defining engagement so expansively that it essentially constitutes any policy relying on positive sanctions; (3) defining engagement in an unnecessarily restrictive manner.

### Precision Impossible

#### Precision impossible—neg definitions undermine conceptual clarity.

Capie and Evans 7 — David H. Capie, Research Fellow and Co-Director of the Armed Groups Project in the Centre for International Relations at the University of British Columbia, and Paul M. Evans, Professor at the Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, 2007 (“Engagement,” *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, Published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ISBN 9812307230, p. 115-116)

According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary, the noun engagement and the verb to engage have several different meanings. Among these, to engage can mean "to employ busily", "to hold a person's attention", "to bind by a promise (usually a marriage)", or to "come into battle with an enemy". The noun engagement can mean "the act or state of engaging or being engaged", an "appointment with another person", "a betrothal", "an encounter between hostile forces", or "a moral commitment". The gerund engaging means to be "attractive or charming". In the literature on security in the Asia-Pacific, engagement most commonly refers to policies regarding the People's Republic of China. However, the term has been used in many different ways leading to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. A Business Week headline summed up the confusion: "Does 'engagement' mean fight or marry?"1

Although one of the most important and ubiquitous terms in the Asia-Pacific security discourse, engagement is generally under-theorized. Most of the literature on the term is either descriptive or prescriptive. There is little agreement about the meaning of engagement and considerable inconsistency in its use. The New York Times noted that "there are many definitions of engagement" and described it as a "moving target".2 This indeterminacy has prompted a host of scholars and officials to offer their own modified [end page 115] interpretations of engagement, for example deep engagement or conditional engagement. These, in turn, have arguably made for less, rather than greater conceptual clarity.

#### Reasonability important when defining “engagement” — avoids an impossible definitional maze.

Drifte 3 — Reinhard Drifte, Professor and Chair of Japanese Studies and Director at the Newcastle East Asia Center at the University of Newcastle, 2003 (“Introduction,” *Japan's Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 1134406673, p. 5-6)

The complex nature of engagement policy

The misunderstanding of the policy of engagement gives rise to considerable confusion because it obfuscates the Realist elements of engagement, i.e. the role of force to effect balancing and hedging. In order to propose remedies to perceived deficiencies of engagement, qualifying adjectives to 'engagement', or even the coinage of new words, have been proposed which make an appropriate understanding of engagement policy even more difficult. Definitions range from unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, comprehensive or constructive engagement, robust engagement, congagement, coercive engagement, to constrainment.8 The resulting definatory maze cannot fail to make the pursuit of engagement difficult at a national level, let alone in tandem with another country. In fact engagement relies as much on Realist foundations, with their deterrence and balance-of-power elements, as on Liberal foundations, which stress the positive forces of increasing international economic interdependence and integration, the spreading of international norms, the establishment of rules and institutions to regulate and enable peaceful cooperation between nations.

The power-balancing and deterrence elements in engagement policy follow the Realist teaching that war can be avoided if there is a stable power balance, but that the shift of power relations (which China drives forward through its economic and military strengthening) is particularly dangerous for the maintenance of peace. The systemic issues for hegemonic stability are how to maintain such stability and how to accommodate change. Realists will point out that multipolar systems like those in Asia are less stable than unipolar systems. The situation in Asia has been depicted as a five-power balance-of-power system, as 'ripe for rivalry', and as heading for instability.9

The following definition of engagement by Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross probably describes best the dualistic character of this policy: 'The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising power's behaviour. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order'. The authors explicitly state that amelioration of the rising power's behaviour does not seek to limit, constrain or delay the newcomer's power, nor to prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power.10 They attach four conditions that will make a policy of engagement effective:

1. the new rising power has only limited revisionist aims and there are no irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the established powers;

2. the established powers are strong enough to mix concessions with credible threats, i.e. a sticks and carrots policy;

3. engagement is a complement and not an alternative to balancing;

4. the established powers must live by the same principles they demand of the new rising power11

When we look carefully at this statement it becomes clear that, for the rising power, 'coercive means' must still be considered in its calculation of the [end page 5] established powers despite their goal of the non-use of 'coercive methods'. Not only is this related to the established powers' Realist objectives (i.e. balancing and hedging) vis-a-vis conceivable intentions of a rising power, but it is also, in the first instance, due to the simple fact that all the established powers, including Japan, maintain considerable military forces and are involved in military alliances to cater for a whole range of challenges to their security. The crucial issue for a correct understanding of Japan's engagement policy (and this would apply to the engagement policy of any other country) is to clarify the emphasis and the robustness with which some rather than other goals associated with engagement are pursued, as well as the mix of policy tools used; one needs to consider issues such as no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty, transparency of military forces, cooperative solutions for transnational problems or respect for basic human rights.12

## Is This Plan Topical?

### For Each Plan…

1. Decide whether the plan is topical or not. If the plan is not topical, what interpretation does it violate? Even if you think the plan is topical, what is the best negative topicality argument to make against this plan? Use the Starter Packet Topicality file for this activity.

2. Decide whether the plan meets “T-Must Be QPQ,” “T-Must Not Be QPQ,” neither, or both.

### 1. TPP

#### 1A. The United States federal government should extend an invitation to the People’s Republic of China to become a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

#### 1B. The United States federal government should offer to invite the People’s Republic of China to the Trans-Pacific Partnership if and only if the People’s Republic of China agrees to diplomatically recognize the independence of Taiwan.

### 2. Tariffs

#### 2A. The United States federal government should eliminate its tariffs on cold-rolled steel imported from the People’s Republic of China.

#### 2B. The United States federal government should offer to eliminate its tariffs on cold-rolled steel imported from the People’s Republic of China if the People’s Republic of China agrees to eliminate its tax rebates to steel exporters.

#### 2C. The United States federal government should reduce its tariffs on cold-rolled steel imported from the People’s Republic of China from 500% to 250%.

### 3. East China Sea

#### 3A. The United States federal government should diplomatically support the People’s Republic of China in its East China Sea territorial disputes with Japan.

#### 3B. The United States federal government should offer to diplomatically support the People’s Republic of China in its East China Sea territorial disputes with Japan.

#### 3C. The United States federal government should offer to diplomatically support the People’s Republic of China in its East China Sea territorial disputes with Japan on the condition that the People’s Republic of China agrees to accept the U.S.’s diplomatic support.

### 4. Military

#### 4A. The United States federal government should substantially increase its arms sales to the Republic of China.

#### 4B. The United States federal government should offer to halt its arms sales to the Republic of China if the People’s Republic of China agrees to discontinue its military exercises in the East China Sea.

#### 4C. The United States federal government should expand its military-to-military training exercises with the People’s Republic of China.

#### 4D. The United States federal government should offer to expand its military-to-military training exercises with the People’s Republic of China.

#### 4E. The United States federal government should offer to expand its military-to-military training exercises with the People’s Republic of China if and only if the People’s Republic of China agrees to continue negotiations over a U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty.

#### 4F. The United States federal government should offer to expand its military-to-military training exercises with the People’s Republic of China if and only if the People’s Republic of China agrees to the terms for the U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty outlined in the U.S.’s latest negotiating position.

### 5. State Visits

#### 5A. The President of the United States should request an official state visit to Beijing.

#### 5B. The President of the United States should invite President Xi to an official state visit at the White House.

#### 5C. The President of the United States should invite President Xi to an official state visit at the White House on the condition that President Xi meet with President Obama to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program.

### 6. S&ED Meetings

#### 6A. The United States federal government should send an official diplomatic request to the People’s Republic of China asking that meetings of The U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue take place twice per year instead of once per year.

#### 6B. The United States federal government should send an official diplomatic request to the People’s Republic of China asking that meetings of the Economic Track of The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (but not the Strategic Track) take place twice per year instead of once per year.

#### 6C. The United States federal government should offer to the People’s Republic of China to send the President of the United States to the next meeting of the Economic Track of The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

#### 6D. The United States federal government should offer to the People’s Republic of China to send the President of the United States to the next meeting of the Economic Track of The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue on the condition that President Xi also attend the meeting.

#### 6E. The United States federal government should offer to the People’s Republic of China to send the President of the United States to the next meeting of the Economic Track of The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue on the condition that President Xi not attend the meeting.

### 7. Third Parties

#### 7A. The United States federal government should establish an HIV/AIDS public health initiative in Kenya and offer to allow the People’s Republic of China to participate in the initiative.

#### 7B. The United States federal government should establish an HIV/AIDS public health initiative in Kenya and offer to allow the People’s Republic of China to participate in the initiative on the condition that the People’s Republic of China commits to provide $500 million in funding to the initiative.

#### 7C. The United States federal government should request that the People’s Republic of China communicate a proposal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to re-establish economic ties with the United States on the condition that the DPRK agree to permanently discontinue ballistic missile tests and allow international inspectors to verify the status of the DPRK’s nuclear program.

#### 7D. The United States federal government should create a new global renewable energy financing bank and invite the European Union, Russia, Brazil, and the People’s Republic of China to join.

### 8. Miscellaneous

#### 8A. The United States federal government should offer to pause negotiations with the People’s Republic of China over a U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty until after the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

#### 8B. The United States federal government should offer not to place comprehensive economic sanctions on the People’s Republic of China if and only if the People’s Republic of China agrees to give up its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, diplomatically recognize the independence of Taiwan, cease manipulating its currency, and implement comprehensive protections for intellectual property.

#### 8C. The United States federal government should support the selection of a President of the World Bank from the People’s Republic of China to replace Dr. Jim Yong Kim at the conclusion of his term in 2017.

#### 8D. The United States federal government should offer to support the People’s Republic of China’s choice to replace Dr. Jim Yong Kim as President of the World Bank at the conclusion of his term in 2017 if the People’s Republic of China agrees to support the United States’s choice for World Bank President in 2023.